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ABSTRACT
AuthenticationcodessuchaspasswordsandPINnumbersarewidelyusedtocontrol
access to resources. One major drawback of these codes is that they are difficult to
remember. Account holders are often faced with a choice between forgetting a code,
which can be inconvenient, or writing it down, which compromises security. In two
studies,wetestanewknowledge-basedauthenticationmethodthatdoesnotimpose
memory load on the user. Psychological research on face recognition has revealed an
important distinction between familiar and unfamiliar face perception: When a face
isfamiliartotheobserver,itcanbeidentifiedacrossawiderangeofimages.However,
whenthefaceisunfamiliar,generalisationacrossimagesispoor.Thiscontrastcanbe
usedasthebasisforapersonalised‘facelock’,inwhichauthenticationsucceedsorfails
basedonimage-invariantrecognitionoffacesthatarefamiliartotheaccountholder.
In Study 1, account holders authenticated easily by detecting familiar targets among
other faces (97.5% success rate), even after a one-year delay (86.1% success rate).
Zero-acquaintance attackers were reduced to guessing (<1% success rate). Even
personalattackerswhoknewtheaccountholderwellwererarelyabletoauthenticate
(6.6% success rate). In Study 2, we found that shoulder-surfing attacks by strangers
could be defeated by presenting different photos of the same target faces in observed
andattackedgrids(1.9%successrate).Ourfindingssuggestthatthecontrastbetween
familiar and unfamiliar face recognition may be useful for developers of graphical
authenticationsystems.
Subjects Psychiatry and Psychology, Human–Computer Interaction
Keywords Face recognition, Identification, Authentication, Human factors
INTRODUCTION
Security codes such as passwords and personal identity numbers (PINs) are widely used
to control access to resources (e.g., bank accounts, websites, mobile devices). To protect
against fraudulent access, it is essential that a security code should be difficult to guess
(Garfinkel & Spafford, 1996; Gehringer, 2002; Carstens, 2009). From this standpoint, a
random sequence of symbols (e.g., “8z3gxFtv”) is a much better password than a user’s
ownsurname(e.g.,“jenkins”).However,securitycodesthataredifficulttoguesstendalso
to be difficult to remember (Ebbinghaus, 1964; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Zviran & Haga,
1990; Zviran & Haga, 1993). For this reason, legitimate code holders are often faced with
a choice between forgetting a code, which can be frustrating and inconvenient, or writing
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2010).
These and other weaknesses (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Sasse, Brostoff & Weirich, 2001)
have led developers to explore other forms of knowledge-based authentication, including
graphical authentication (Blonder, 1996; Biddle, Chiasson & Van Oorschot, 2012). In such
systems,auser’sauthenticationcodeisasetofimagesratherthananalphanumericstring.
To log in, users identify their own images from larger challenge sets (Podd, Bunnell &
Henderson, 1996; Brostoff & Sasse, 2000; Dhamija & Perrig, 2000; Furnell, Papadopoulos &
Dowland, 2004; Weinshall & Kirkpatrick, 2004). One of the most well developed of these
systems is Passfaces (Brostoff & Sasse, 2000), in which the images used are photographs of
faces. Passfaces offers several advantages over standard passwords, most notably higher
memorability of authentication codes (Paivio & Csapo, 1973). For example, an early
evaluation found that after a 5-month delay, 72% of participants remembered their
Passfaces codes on their first login attempt (Valentine, 1998). For comparison, a similar
evaluation of passwords found that only 27% of passwords were remembered following a
delayof3months(Zviran&Haga,1993).Inapioneeringfieldtrial,Brostoff&Sasse(2000)
reported that login failures were three times higher for passwords than for Passfaces. This
estimate is consistent with previous findings. However, such graphical systems are not
without their limitations (Furnell, Papadopoulos & Dowland, 2004; Tari, Ozok & Holden,
2006;Everittetal.,2009;Mihajlov&Jerman-Blazic,2011).Perhapsforemostamongtheseis
their susceptibility to ‘shoulder-surfing’ attacks (Tari, Ozok & Holden, 2006), in which
an attacker obtains a user’s authentication code by secretly watching the user during
authentication.Thisattackispowerfulbecauseitexploitsthememorabilityofimage-based
codes:imagesthatareeasyfortheusertorecognisearealsoeasyforanattackertorecognise
(Paivio&Csapo,1973).
In the present study we show that this symmetry—between ease of recognition for the
user, and ease of recognition for the attacker—can be broken by applying insights from
cognitive psychology research. Psychological studies of face recognition have revealed
strong qualitative differences between processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces (Burton
& Jenkins, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2011). When a face is familiar to the viewer, it can be
identified from a wide range of different photographs, even when image quality is very
poor(Harmon,1973;Burtonetal.,1999;Burton,Jenkins&Schweinberger,2011;seeFig.1).
Importantly for this study, different images of a familiar face are almost never mistaken
for different people (Jenkins et al., 2011). In contrast, our ability to identify unfamiliar
faces from photographs is strikingly poor (Bruce et al., 1999; Bruce et al., 2001). Very
often,differentphotos ofan unfamiliarfaceare seenasdifferentindividuals (Jenkinset al.,
2011). Thus, familiarity with a particular face determines one’s ability to identify it across
changes in image (see Fig. 2). Although the transformative effect of familiarity on face
recognitionmaybenotbeintuitivelyobvious,itishighlyrobust,andhasbeenreplicatedin
dozens of experiments spanning decades of research (Bruce, 1982; Clutterbuck & Johnston,
2002;Clutterbuck&Johnston,2004;Clutterbuck&Johnston,2005;Megreya&Burton,2006;
Jenkinsetal.,2011).
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 2/24Figure 1 Matching a face to a poor quality CCTV image. Example images from Burton et al. (1999).
Matching poor quality images is easy for observers who are familiar with the faces concerned. Perfor-
mance of unfamiliar observers is strikingly poor. These images both show the same person.
The familiarity contrast is normally encountered as a problem in applied settings. For
example, unfamiliar face matching presents a serious challenge for security personnel
and for automatic face recognition systems. In the present study we offer a very different
perspective by describing how the familiarity contrast might be exploited positively
as the basis of an authentication system. The principle is straightforward: familiarity
with a particular face determines an observer’s ability to identify it across different
photographs. For any individual face that is not widely known, this ability will be very
narrowly concentrated within the population. If a set of such faces is known only to a
single individual, it can be used to create a personalized lock. Access is granted to anyone
who demonstrates image-invariant recognition of the critical faces, that is, anyone who is
familiar with them all. Conversely, access is denied to anyone who does not demonstrate
image-invariant recognition of the critical faces, that is, anyone who is not familiar with
themall.
To test this principle, we developed a prototype system that involves presenting a series
of face arrays, similar to Passfaces. In our scheme, each array contains one face that is
familiar to the user, among other faces that are unfamiliar. The user gains access by simply
indicating the familiar face in each array. We refer to this method as Facelock. The scheme
has two major advantages over traditional authentication methods. First, there is no
explicit memory involved—the task is simply to pick out the familiar face in each array.
Asthistaskdoesnotrequiretheusertorememberacode,theissueofforgettingone’scode
does not arise. Dispensing with a set code also means that the challenge arrays, and the
familiar faces embedded in them, may be composed of different photographs of different
individuals at each login. This is very different from the traditional approach of assigning
a single invariant authentication code to an account holder. The second major advantage
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 3/24Figure2 Familiarandunfamiliarfacematching. (A) Matching identical images is trivial. (B) Matching
different images of unfamiliar faces is hard. (C) Matching different images of familiar faces is easy.
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2008; Tam, Glassman & Vandenwauver, 2010). In the proposed scheme, the user is not
required to reproduce a particular set code in order to authenticate. The only requirement
is to distinguish familiar faces from unfamiliar faces. As familiarity discriminations are
extremely robust (Young, Hay & Ellis, 1985; De Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1991), users
havenoincentivetowritedownaide-memoiresfortheirtargets,andtheassociatedsecurity
riskcanbeavoided.
The main aims of the current work are (i) to test the feasibility of an authentication
method that exploits the familiarity contrast in face recognition, and (ii) to assess its
resilience against two very different forms of attack—guessing by high-acquaintance
attackers, and shoulder-surfing by zero-acquaintance attackers. The aim at this stage is
not to develop a commercially viable system. Instead we seek to raise awareness of the
important psychological contrast between familiar and unfamiliar face processing, and
to explore the potential for exploiting this contrast in the context of authentication. We
begin in Study 1 by comparing authentication rates for legitimate account holders with
authentication rates for (i) zero-acquaintance attackers, and (ii) personal attackers who
know the participants very well (e.g., spouses, family members). In Study 2 we examine
whether a full-visibility shoulder-surfing attack can be thwarted by presenting different
photographsofthesametargetstotheparticipantandtheattacker.
STUDY 1
The main aim of the first study was to establish whether participants could in practice
generate suitable target faces. These should be faces that the participants know well, so
that they could easily recognise them from photographs, but that other people do not
know well, so that all of the faces in the array are unfamiliar to potential attackers. If such
targets can be found, then it should be possible to differentiate between account holders
and attackers by comparing target detection performance. To anticipate, we found that
suitable targets were readily volunteered by participants. Authentication rates were very
highforlegitimateusers,evenafteradelayofoneyear.Incontrast,authenticationratesfor
attackerswereverylow,evenwhentheattackerswerecloseacquaintancesoftheusers.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 396 volunteers contributed data. 120 were volunteers who responded to our
recruitment email (54 male, 66 female; age range 18–79). These 120 volunteers served
as account holders in the current study. A further 110 volunteers were recruited from
our participant pool to act as zero-acquaintance attackers, that is, people who knew
nothing about the account holders. For comparison, we also asked each account holder
to nominate two close acquaintances (e.g., spouses, family members) who could act as
personal attackers. We reasoned that the faces of people who are familiar to participants
might also be familiar to their close acquaintances, giving these personal attackers a
significantadvantage.Weacknowledgethatthispersonalattackerselectionisunrealistic,as
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 5/24Figure3 SelectingFacelocktargets. A schematic diagram summarising the requirements of target faces.
If the target is familiar to the attacker, the attacker will be able to authenticate. If the target is unfamiliar
to the account holder, the account holder will be unable to authenticate. The tick represents the region of
acceptable targets.
itassumesthatattacksonlyevercomefromcloseacquaintances,andneverfromstrangers.
However, we prefer here to underestimate the security of the system than to overestimate
it. 166 nominated attackers took part. All account holders and nominated attackers were
offeredentryinto aprizedrawfor aniPodNano.The studyreceivedethicalapprovalfrom
theFIMSFacultyEthicsCommitteeattheUniversityofGlasgow(CSE00871).
Design and procedure
The study consisted of seven distinct phases—three preparation phases and four test
phases.Wedescribeeachofthesebelow.
Phase 1: target nomination
Account holders nominated four or more target faces by entering the targets’ names
on the project website. As the proposed system relies on account holders and attackers
having contrasting degrees of familiarity with the targets, appropriate selection of targets
was critical. Ideally, an account holder’s targets should be well known to the account
holder, but unknown to other people. Our pilot work indicated that it can be difficult
spontaneously to generate targets that satisfy both of these requirements. For this reason,
we provided account holders with the following instructions in order to guide them to
the appropriate region of their search space. Figure 3 represents the constraints on target
selectionschematically.
“Thenextpagewillaskyoutolistsomeminorcelebrities—reallyminorcelebrities.
Almost everyone recognises the ‘A-List’ celebrities below [photos of international
celebritiessuchasmajorfilmstars].Mostpeoplealsorecognisesome‘B-List’celebrities
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‘Z-List’celebrities.
By‘Z-List’celebrities,wemeanpeoplewhoare(orwere):
1. Only famous within a narrow field of interest. For example, a famous skier or a
famouscellist.Thiscouldincludesomeonewhowasfamousmanyyearsago,butwhois
notwellknownthesedays.
2.Wellknowntoyou,sothatyouwouldeasilyrecognisethemfromphotographs.
3. Not well known to the public at large, so that you would not expect others to
recognisethem.
4.PossibletofindusingaGoogleImagesearch.
Thisisthemostchallengingpartofthestudy,butalsothemostimportant.”
Having read these instructions, account holders were asked to submit the names of
four or more targets, up to a maximum of ten. There was no time limit for this task, and
account holders were free to log out and return later to complete it. Once an account
holderwassatisfiedwiththispersonallist,thenamesweretransferredtotheexperimenter.
Each account holder was also asked to provide email addresses of two close acquaintances
(e.g.,spouses,familymembers)whowouldbewillingtoactaspersonalattackers.
Phase 2: image collection
Targets who had already been nominated by another account holder (<1%) were
eliminated to avoid ambiguity at login. For all other targets, the experimenter collected
at least four face photographs by using the target’s name as a Google Image search term.
We accepted the first four photographs in which the whole face was visible, regardless
of viewing angle, lighting, age, or other sources of image variability. This resulted in 4
differentphotographsforeachof603faces(2412imagesintotal).Allphotoswerecropped
to a rectangular frame measuring 100 pixels wide ×119 pixels high for presentation. The
collectedphotosofeachaccountholder’stargetswerethenuploadedtotheprojectwebsite
forthataccountholdertoapprove.
Phase 3: image approval
Account holders returned to the website to view the photos of their targets and to approve
or decline each image. The purpose of this step was twofold. First, it allowed us to ensure
that the photos depicted the correct individual. This was necessary as names are rarely
uniqueidentifiers,andsearchresultsinvariablyincludedimagesofmore thanoneperson.
Second,itallowedustoconfirmthatthereturnedimageswereindeedrecognisabletotheir
nominators. Declined images (<1%) were replaced until the account holder was satisfied
with the selection. Image approval was followed by a delay of one week to allow forgetting
of the selection procedure. Account holders then received an email requesting them to
returntoidentifytheirfacesagain.
Phase 4: account holder login (one week delay)
After the one-week delay, account holders returned to the project website and attempted
to authenticate. The account holder’s lock consisted of a series of four different challenge
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challenge sets; see Fig. 4). In each grid, one image (the target) was a random photo of a
personselectedatrandomfromthataccountholder’spooloftargetnames.Theremaining
eight images (the distractors) were random photos of faces drawn at random from other
account holders’ pools of targets. Allocation of the nine images to the nine grid positions
was randomised so that location was not predictive of target/distractor status. This meant
that from the perspective of the account holder, each grid contained one familiar face
among eight unfamiliar faces. However, from the perspective of an attacker, all nine
faces should be unfamiliar. The account holder’s task was simply to click on the familiar
face in each grid. Identifying the correct image in all four grids resulted in successful
authentication.Theprobability ofopeningthelock bychancealonewasthus 1in6561,or
0.015%,forthisparticularinstantiation.
Nofeedbackwasgivenuntiltheendofthefour-gridlock,afterwhichtheaccountholder
was told whether or not the authentication attempt was successful. If the attempt was
unsuccessful, the lock was reset using newly selected photos, and the account holder was
asked to try again. Following successful authentication, or three unsuccessful attempts,
the account holder proceeded to a brief questionnaire concerning account holders’
impressionsofthesystem.
Phase 5: zero-acquaintance attacker entry
In small-scale pilot studies, we found that medium-acquaintance attackers (work
colleagues) were never successful. To estimate the success rate in a larger sample, we
recruited 114 zero-acquaintance volunteers to attack a randomly allocated lock. These
114 volunteers undertook 207 attacks between them. The authentication procedure for
the attacker phase was exactly the same as for the account holder phase, with one of
the account holder’s targets and eight non-target faces making up each grid. As with
the account holder entry phase, no performance feedback was given until successful
authentication, or three unsuccessful attempts. We expected that if the account holder
chose appropriate targets, none of these faces should be familiar to the attacker, and
the success rate should not exceed chance levels. The zero-acquaintance attackers were
recruitedtoverifythatthiswasthecase.However,ourmaininterestwasinthesuccessrate
ofthepersonalattackers.
Phase 6: personal attacker entry
In the first phase of the study, each account holder was asked to provide email addresses
of two close acquaintances who would be willing to act as personal attackers. A total
of 166 personal attackers agreed to take part, undertaking 249 attacks between them.
Importantly, attackers only attacked their own nominator, so that every attack was from
a close personal acquaintance of the account holder (e.g., spouse, family member), rather
than from a stranger. Again, the authentication procedure was the same as for the account
holder phase. If the account holder chose appropriate targets, all of the faces in all of the
grids should be unknown to the attacker. We reasoned that high-acquaintance attackers
might have acquired a degree of familiarity with their nominators’ targets, due to shared
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 8/24Figure4 AchallengegridinFacelock.Anexamplegridconsistingofoneface(thetarget)thatisfamiliar
to one of our account holders, and eight faces that are unfamiliar to the same account holder. Readers are
invited to guess which of the nine faces is the target. For someone who doesn’t know the account holder,
it is difficult to find any basis for this decision.
exposure (e.g., overlapping interests or media consumption), thus providing a more
stringent test. As with the account holder entry phase, no performance feedback was
givenuntiltheendoftheentirefour-gridsequencethatcomprisedasinglelock.Following
successfulauthentication,orthreeunsuccessfulattempts,theattackerproceededtoabrief
questionnaireconcerningattackers’impressionsofthesystem.
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N Succeeded Succeeded(1stattempt) Failed
Account holders (1 week delay) 120 117 97.5% 101 84.1% 3 2.5%
Account holders (1 year delay) 79 68 86.1% 62 78.5% 11 13.9%
Zero-acquaintance attackers 114 1 0.9% 0 0% 113 99.1%
Personal attackers 166 11 6.6% 5 3.0% 155 93.4%
Phase 7: account holder login (one year delay)
One year after the initial account holder login phase, account holders were asked to
authenticate asecond time. This was theonly contact between experimenters and account
holders since the initial login phase, and our log confirmed that none of the participants
had visited the project website during the intervening months. Thus, the one year
interval provided an excellent opportunity for account holders to forget about the study
(Ebbinghaus, 1964). Previous research has shown that passwords are quickly forgotten
once they fall into disuse (Witty & Brittain, 2004). For example, two studies of password
memorability (Zviran & Haga, 1990; Zviran & Haga, 1993) reported memorability rates
of 35% and 27.2% after a delay of five months. Given that a putative advantage of our
familiarity-based approach is that it imposes no memory load, we predicted relatively
preservedauthenticationratesevenafterayearofdisuse.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Authentication data
As can be seen in Table 1, 97.5% of account holders (117/120) successfully authenticated,
with 84.2% (101/120) succeeding on the first attempt. In contrast, only 6.6% of personal
attackers (11/166) were successful, and only 3.0% (5/166) on the first attempt. This
compares favourably with previous analyses based on Passfaces (Davis, Monrose & Reiter,
2004).
Chi Square analysis of these total success rates confirmed a highly significant difference
between account holders and personal attackers [χ2(1) = 232.6, p < .0001]. We also note
that the majority of account holders’ failures to authenticate were ‘near misses’, in which
three of the four targets were correctly identified. For personal attackers, near misses were
theleastfrequentauthenticationfailure.
Only one attack by a zero-acquaintance attacker was successful, precluding any
statistical analysis for this group. However, the circumstances of the one successful attack
areperhapsrevealing.Specificallytheaccountholderhadnotchosen‘Z-List’celebritiesas
required. Indeed, for the successfully attacked lock, two of the four faces were members of
the rock band Led Zeppelin (Robert Plant, Jimmy Page), perhaps analogous to choosing
“ledzeppelin”asapassword.
Analysisofthe11successfulattacksbynominatedattackersrevealedsimilarregularities.
In five of these cases, the account holders had chosen widely-known celebrities as targets
(e.g., Tony Blair, John Wayne), instead of ‘Z-List’ celebrities. In a further three cases,
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Since virtually all of the distractor faces were Caucasian, these account holders’ targets
were presumably easy for their nominated attackers to guess. Nominated attackers were
always close acquaintances of the account holders in this study, and so knew the ethnic
backgroundoftheaccountholderstheywereattacking.Fortheremainingthreesuccessful
attacks, we suggest that the attackers had some degree of familiarity with their account
holders nominated targets—enough to set the targets apart from the distractors. For
example, musicians that one likes might be recognized by one’s spouse, due to shared
exposure.
Taken together, the success rates of account holders (97.5%), randomly zero-
acquaintance attackers (<1%), and nominated high-acquaintance attackers (6.6%) strike
us as a promising starting point. Analysis of successful attacks provides little evidence that
theprincipleofexploitingfamiliaritycontrastisproblematic.Rather,themainchallengeis
theseparableproblemofcompliance:ifthesystemisnotusedasintended,itdoesnotwork
as well. This limitation is characteristic of a wide range of security systems—including
passwords,PINcodes,andmechanicallocks.
Delayed authentication
79 of our initial account holders returned to login a second time, following a one-year
delay. As can be seen in Table 1, 86.1% of these returning account holders (68/79)
successfully authenticated, 78.5% (62/79) on their first attempt. This is a remarkably
well-preservedsuccessrateoversuchalongperiodofdisuse,especiallygiventhatdifferent
imagesoftheaccountholders’targetswerepresentedatthedelayedlogin.Forcomparison,
previous research reported a first-attempt authentication rate of 77% after only two
weeks when using traditional passwords (Bunnell et al., 1997). Established graphical
authentication systems are also vulnerable to memory decay, though generally to a lesser
degreethanpasswords.Oneinfluentialstudy(Valentine,1998)reportedanauthentication
rate of 72% (by third attempt) after a five-month delay when using Passfaces. Although
thesecomparisonsinvolveratherdifferentauthenticationmethods,theyhighlightthevery
differentdemandsofrecall-based,recognition-based,andfamiliarity-baseddecisions.
Weattributeaccountholders’highsuccessrateinthepresentstudytotwomainfactors.
First, there was no authentication code to remember, so the classic problem of account
holders forgetting authentication codes did not apply. Second, our account holders had
already established robust mental representations of their target faces prior to the study
(they were familiar faces), so presenting different images of these targets did little to
impederecognition(Jenkins&Burton,2011).Interestingly,anumberofreturningaccount
holders commented on the surprising ease of authentication under these conditions. One
wrote, “I didn’t think I could log in because I couldn’t remember any of the people I
chose—but I did!” Interestingly, another reported, “I got them all right. Did you use the
same images of the people or different ones? I got the impression that I did not recognise
theimagebuttheperson”.
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items from Study 1.
I wrote my targets’ names down to remember them. 0%
I found it hard to identify my target faces. 10%
Upon reflection, I would have chosen different target faces. 80%
I was confused by recognising more than one face in a grid. 16%
I would be prepared to use a system like this to log in rather than a password. 31%
Table 3 Attacker questionnaire data from Study 1. Mean Likert scale ratings (1–5) for personal attack-
ers’ questionnaire items from Study 1.
How much effort was involved in guessing the targets? 2.9
How hard was it to put yourself into the account holder’s shoes to guess his/her targets? 3.5
How successful do you think you were? 2.3
How well do you know the person? 4.4
Account holders’ questionnaire data
Account holders responded to five questionnaire items concerning user experience.
SummariesoftheseresponsescanbeseeninTable2.
The questionnaire data contain little evidence that account holders had difficulty using
this system. None of the account holders reported writing down their targets’ names.
This suggests that they correctly understood that forgetting their targets was not an issue.
Only 10% of account holders reported difficulty in identifying their target faces. Thus
most account holders were successful in nominating faces that they could recognise well.
Interestingly, the great majority of account holders (80%) stated that with the benefit of
hindsight, they would have chosen different targets. Presumably, since account holders
had little trouble recognising targets that they actually chose, their motive here was not
making authentication easier for themselves, but making it harder for attackers. 16% of
account holders reported recognising one of the non-target faces in a grid. However, the
overall authentication rate of 97.5% implies that this confusion rarely stopped them from
authenticating correctly. On the basis of this experimental trial, 31% of participants said
thattheywoulduseaFacelocksysteminsteadofapassword,25%saidtheywouldnot,and
44% were undecided. Given that we made no concessions to usability and HCI issues in
this study, it is perhaps surprising that 31% of respondents were positively disposed to the
method.
Personal attackers’ questionnaire data
Personal attackers responded to four questionnaire items using a 5-point Likert scale,
where1indicatesalowrating,and5indicatesahighrating.Meanratingsforeachitemare
showninTable3.
Personal attackers found guessing their account holders’ targets moderately effortful,
and found it quite difficult to imagine who the account holder might have chosen.
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 12/24Figure 5 Attack success as a function of personal acquaintance. Scatterplot showing the relationship
between personal attackers’ acquaintance ratings and the number of correctly guessed targets in their
first attacks. The area of each datapoint is proportional to the number of cases contributing to it.
Consistent with these impressions, they rated their level of success as rather poor overall,
though even this rating is a generous appraisal of their actual success rate. Personal
attackersknewtheiraccountholdersverywelloverall,confirminggoodcomplianceamong
account holders at the attacker nomination stage. To test whether personal attackers were
more successful the better they knew their victims, we computed the correlation between
theseattackers’acquaintanceratingsforItem4above,andthenumberofcorrectly-guessed
targets(0–4)intheirfirstattacks(seeFig.5).
This correlation was moderately positive and highly reliable [R = 0.29, N = 166,
p < 0.001]. Importantly, lower acquaintance attackers (ratings <4) were never successful.
WereturntotheissueofacquaintanceintheGeneralDiscussionsection.
STUDY 2
The preceding study confirmed that account holders who were familiar with the target
faces could easily distinguish these faces from unfamiliar non-targets, regardless of the
particular photos that were used to portray them. In contrast, attackers found it very
difficulttoguessaccountholders’targets,evenwhentheattackerswerecloseacquaintances
oftheaccountholders.
The second study focuses on a different aspect of the proposal, specifically the use
of multiple photos of each target. We also sought to compare the resilience of different
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modelled a best-case scenario for shoulder-surfing attacks, in which we presented the
correct authentication sequence to attackers under full-visibility viewing conditions, and
then asked them immediately to replicate the sequence using different photographs of the
same target faces. Attackers were thus required to generate the sequence of identities that
theyhadjustseen,eventhoughthoseidentitieswereportrayedusingdifferentimages.
AsinStudy1,weloadedthissituationheavilyintheattackers’favour.First,weusedthe
same four target identities for the observation sequence and the replication sequence,
rather than drawing a set of four targets at random from the account holders’ entire
pool. Second, we presented these same four targets in the same order in both sequences,
rather than presenting them in a different random order each time. Third, attackers did
not have to glance furtively at the authentication sequences for fear of being noticed.
Instead, we presented the sequences very clearly to the attackers, who were asked to give
it their full attention. Finally, there was no delay between the observation sequence and
the replication task. Thus attackers’ memory decay was minimized. These real world
complications were eliminated in an effort to isolate the impact of a photo change. It is
alreadyestablishedthatreplicatingafour-itemsequenceiswellwithinthelimitsofhuman
short-term memory. This is true in experimental settings (Miller, 1956), and also in the
context of shoulder-surfing 4-digit PIN numbers (Anderson, 1993). However, the present
case differs from previous studies in that different images of each item are used at the
sequence replication stage. If attackers are able to integrate across different photos of each
targetefficiently,thenperformanceshouldbeclosetoceiling(Miller,1956).Alternatively,if
a change in photograph impedes identification in this situation, then performance should
be relatively poor, even when the authentication code is clearly presented to the attacker
immediatelybeforetheattack.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-two postgraduate volunteers (6 male, 26 female; age range 21–36) completed
the study. The study received ethical approval from the FIMS Ethics Committee at the
UniversityofGlasgow.
Design and procedure
Each participant attacked five locks so that each lock was attacked 32 times. The five locks
(i.e., 5 different 4-grid sequences) were drawn at random from those that led to successful
authentication by account holders in Study 1. In other words, the authentication rate for
accountholderswas100%forthissampleoflocks.Foreachlock,adifferent-imageversion
was also constructed, by replacing the target from each grid with a different photo of the
sameperson,andreplacingtheeightnon-targetswithdifferentnon-targets.
As with the original grids, the location of the images in the grid was randomised.
To make the task as easy as possible for the attackers, grid order was preserved across
observationandreplicationsequences,sothatthesametargetsappearedinthesameorder
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 14/24Table 4 Shoulder-surfing data from Study 2. Columns refer to the different locks, and rows refer to the
number of correctly-guessed targets. All four targets must be correctly guessed for the attacker to gain
entry.
Correctly-guessed
targets
Lock1 Lock2 Lock3 Lock4 Lock5
0 9 0 5 15 9
1 10 4 14 10 13
2 11 16 12 7 9
3 2 9 1 0 1
4 0 3 0 0 0
(1–4) in both versions of the lock. The different-image versions of the grids were printed
at a size of 10 cm × 12 cm and bound into response booklets. The original grids were
projected at a size of 150 cm×180 cm using a computer controlled data projector, which
attackersviewedatadistanceofbetween3and5metres.
For each of the five locks, attackers first watched the authentication sequence using
the original grids, and then tried to replicate the sequence on the different-image grids,
that is, to copy the account holder’s authentication code. To demonstrate each sequence
as clearly as possible, each one of the four grids was presented on screen for 5 s together
with its grid number (1–4). After the first 2 s, a green frame appeared around one of the
faces, identifying that face as the target (analogous to watching the account holder select
thatface).Asfaceidentificationisnormallyaccomplishedwithinabout200msofstimulus
onset (Liu, Harris & Kanwisher, 2002), we expected this presentation time to allow full
encodingofthecorrecttarget.Thisprocedurewasintendedtomodelobservationoftarget
selection in an optimal shoulder surfing situation, in which all the necessary information
is presented clearly at the focus of attention. Readers are invited to simulate this task for a
singlegridbycomparingFigs.6and4.
Successivegridsineachlockwereseparatedbyablankintervalof2s.Immediatelyafter
the fourth target had been revealed, attackers were asked to reproduce the sequence they
hadjustseen,bycirclingthesamefourtargetsontheirresponsesheets.Therewasnotime
limit for this task. When the attackers were ready to proceed (<60 s in all cases), the next
authentication sequence was initiated. All 32 participants attacked the same 5 locks once,
resultingin160attacksintotal.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
RawfrequencydataareshowninTable4.Only3outof160attacksweresuccessful(1.9%).
This strikes us as a very promising figure, especially given the privileged conditions of
attack. When attempting to replicate the authentication sequence, attackers saw the same
targets presented in the same order under highly favourable viewing conditions and with
no time pressure. Only the photo used for each face was changed. As it turned out, this
alonewasenoughtodefeattheseshoulder-surfingattacks.
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difficult to determine which face is repeated simply by trying to memorise Fig. 4. Side-by-side matching
of unfamiliar faces is also highly error prone (Jenkins & Burton, 2008; Jenkins & Burton, 2011).
Wenote thatallthree successfulattackswereon thesamelock. Inspectionofthe targets
in this particular lock suggests that this may be due to their distinctive appearance. For
example, one of the targets was bald and wore glasses in both photos; another was an
elderly woman with permed white hair. As none of the distractor faces shared these
features,thematchingtargetswerepresumablyrathersalientinthiscontext.IntheGeneral
Discussionweconsiderhowthissituationcouldbeavoided.
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Summary of findings
Two studies tested a knowledge-based authentication system that exploits the psycholog-
ical contrast between familiar and unfamiliar face recognition. In Study 1 we found that
account holders were able to generate target faces that were well known to themselves, but
were not well known to other people. Account holders authenticated easily by detecting
these familiar targets among other faces (97.5% success rate), and this was the case even
after a one-year delay (86.1% success rate). By contrast, zero-acquaintance attackers
were reduced to guessing (<1% attacks rate). Even personal attackers who knew the
account holder well were rarely able to authenticate (6.6% success rate). This success
rate for attacks compares favourably with previous studies. Analysing a system based on
Passfaces, Davis, Monrose & Reiter (2004) conclude that 10% of authentication codes
could be guessed within one or two attempts, even by very low acquaintance attackers
who know only the gender or race of the account holder. Here we found a successful
attack rate of 6.6% within three attempts for very high acquaintance attackers who knew
a great deal about the account holder. In Study 2 we found that optimal shoulder-surfing
attacks by strangers could be repelled simply by using different photos of the targets in
the observed and attacked grids (1.9% success rate). Together, these findings suggest that
the contrast between familiar and unfamiliar face recognition may be useful for graphical
authentication systems. Although face-based systems have been developed previously,
these have always conflated face recognition and image recognition, by representing each
face with a single image (Jenkins et al., 2011). As image memory will be equally excellent
for account holders and attackers, such systems are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attacks
(Tari, Ozok & Holden, 2006). The use of different photographs for each target confounds
attackerswhoareunfamiliarwiththetargets,butdoesnotimpedelegitimateuserswhoare
familiarwiththeirchosentargets.
The approach we describe here offers two advantages. First, unlike a conventional
password, it does not require the account holder to remember anything specific to
the authentication procedure, as the task is simply to indicate which of several faces is
familiar. The system thus exerts very little memory load compared with conventional
passwords. Our most striking evidence for this comes from the delayed authentication
task in Study 1. Here, account holder’s authentication rate was 86%, one year after a
single login. This is unprecedented for knowledge based authentication systems (Sasse,
Brostoff & Weirich, 2001). For comparison, one evaluation of traditional passwords
reported authentication rates of 27% after just 3 months (Zviran & Haga, 1993). A similar
evaluation of Passfaces found authentication rates of 72% after 5 months (Valentine,
1998). Such studies contribute to the general finding that memory decay impacts image
recognitionlessthanitimpactspasswordrecall.Hereweshowthatmemorydecayimpacts
face familiarity judgements even less. Second, it does not matter greatly if authentication
is observed. As Study 2 shows, even when an attacker sees the same set of targets when
attempting to authenticate, authentication is still difficult when different photos of those
targets are presented. Previous work has shown that Passfaces is highly vulnerable to
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Threat Vulnerability Attackexploits Facelockmitigation
Guessability Predictable choices Knowledge of a user Targets are minor celebrities
Ease of shoulder surfing Observation of user selecting faces Different images of different targets for each login
Observability
Ease of intersection attacks Refreshing the screen to see which
face stays the same
Different images of different targets at each refresh
Limited login attempts
Ease of recording targets’ names User insecure behaviour No incentive for account holders to write down
target names
Recordability
Ease of recording the screen Use of mobile phone cameras or
screen shots
Different images of different targets for each login
shoulder surfing when a mouse pointer is used to select targets. Participants in that study
ratedthevulnerabilityofPassfacesat5.2onascalefrom1(notvulnerable)to7(extremely
vulnerable), indicating that shoulder surfers found it very easy to obtain the faces by
observation. In the same study, dictionary based passwords were rated 4.85 in terms of
vulnerability. Interestingly, using a keyboard instead of a mouse to select targets reduced
the vulnerability of Passfaces from 5.2 to 2.3, presumably because keyboard entry forced
onlookerstodividetheirattentionbetweenthescreenandthekeyboard(Braun,1998).For
thesamereason,keyboardinputshouldstrengthentheschemeweproposehere.
Limitations
Our testing exposed a number of important limitations to the system in its experimental
form. First, the lock is vulnerable to an attacker who, like the account holder, knows the
targetfaces.ThiswasevidentinStudy1,inwhichattackerswhowereclosestacquaintances
of the account holders correctly guessed more targets than attackers who were less close
acquaintances. This vulnerability underscores the importance of appropriate target
selection.Onewayforasecretholdertominimiseriskwouldbetomaintainalargepoolof
target faces, and to sample these from disparate fields of interest, so that no single attacker
knowsenoughtargetstoauthenticate.
A second limitation is that attackers may be able to match different images of targets
whose appearance is both distinctive (e.g., bald head and round glasses), and stable
(i.e., similar appearance in all photos). This was seen in Study 2, where one lock that
contained highly distinctive faces could be compromised in a shoulder-surfing attack.
For similar reasons, target distinctiveness may be a concern whenever an account holder’s
targets are all drawn from a single ethnic group or age band. These risks could be reduced
byavoidinghighlydistinctivefaces,andbyavoidingsimilarimagesofanyparticulartarget.
De Angeli et al. (2005) proposed that graphical authentication mechanisms such as
Facelock should be assessed in terms of guessability, observability and recordability
when considering how they can be breached. Table 5 shows a threat model based on this
taxonomy.
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One pragmatic concern is scalability. Our experimental implementation of Facelock
involved a multi-step enrollment process, and required considerable human labour to
find images of targets and verify these with the account holders. This may not be feasible
for a large-scale system. Unless these steps can be significantly streamlined, the approach
maybebettersuitedtosmall-scaleorpersonaldeploymentssuchaslockingcomputersand
mobiledevicesthantolarge-scaledeploymentssuchassecuringbankaccounts.
The studies we report here suggest a number of possible directions for future
development. One would be to select non-targets automatically for each grid based on
their similarity to the target. For example, if the target for a particular grid is a young
Asian female, the non-targets used to complete that grid could also be young Asian
females. Increasing the homogeneity of the grids should undermine attacks that rely on
distinctiveness to infer targets (Study 1). This functionality would require all images in
the system to be tagged with properties such as age, sex, and race. Automatic tagging
is currently a major focus of image analysis (Datta et al., 2008), and much progress
has been made in recent years (see Bengio, 2009, for an instructive overview). Indeed,
humansimilarityratingsoffacescanalreadybeaccuratelypredictedbyautomaticsystems
(Lacroix, Postma & Murre, 2005), which could dramatically improve the effectiveness of
facelockimagearrays.
We noted in Study 1 that 80% of account holders would choose different targets if they
could choose again. As authentication failures were so rare among these account holders,
it seems reasonable to assume that they would not have chosen different targets to make
their own authentication even easier, but rather to make fraudulent access even harder.
Presumably faces that are less widely known occurred to these account holders after the
study had begun, and the account holders realised that these would make better targets. If
so,allowingaccountholderstoupdatetheirpooloftargetfacescouldimprovethesecurity
ofthesystem.
A related issue concerns the optimal number and set size of the grids that are used to
authenticate. In the present studies we arbitrarily chose a sequence of four 3 × 3 grids,
which corresponds to a guessing rate of 1 in 6,561. It would be technically trivial to
change the guessing rate by changing the grid configuration (e.g., 1 in 1,048,576 for 5
different 4 × 4 grids), but implementation details are not our priority here. Our main
concern is whether familiarity contrasts in face recognition may be exploited to improve
the security of authentication systems. This question is independent of any particular grid
configuration. Dedicated usability studies will be required to examine trade offs between
security and ease of use. Such studies should also seek to optimise task instructions to
make them as easy as possible to follow. In Study 1, five of the eleven successful attacks
from personal attackers, and the single successful attack from a random attacker, were
all attributable to account holders nominating major celebrities as their targets, despite
instructions to the contrary. Clearer instructions, or tighter constraints on the target
nominationprocess,couldmitigatethisvulnerability.
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Althoughwehaveoutlinedanovelapproachtographicalauthenticationusingfaces,there
are clearly very many issues outstanding. In this final section we highlight some of these
in the hope that we can be as clear as possible in articulating what is and is not claimed for
thisproposal.
• We are not presenting Facelock as a packaged product that is ready to deploy. Instead
we offer these initial studies as proof of principle. Our focus throughout is on the
familiarityofafacetotheobserver,andhowthisprofoundlyaffectstheobserver’sability
to process images of that face. The key contrast between familiar and unfamiliar face
perception has seldom been addressed in the computer science literature (Sinha et al.,
2006). Here we hope to have demonstrated that this contrast may be usefully exploited
in graphical authentication systems. However, a number of usability issues (discussed
above)wouldneedtoberesolvedbeforesuchasystemcouldbepracticallydeployed.
• We do not claim that the proposed system is flawless. In the studies we present, some
account holders failed to authenticate, and some attackers succeeded. We address both
of these outcomes, alongside other limitations of the studies, in the discussion section
of the paper. Our main emphasis is the relative performance of observers who are
familiarorunfamiliarwiththefacesconcerned.Inperceptualexperiments,recognition
performance is radically different for these two groups. Here we show that the same
applieswhenthetaskisincorporatedinanauthenticationsystem.
• We are not claiming that Facelock is superior to Passfaces. Any such evaluation would
require a direct comparison of the two approaches, and we have not attempted that
here.PreviousstudieshavelookedatmemorabilityofPassfaces(Valentine,1998)andits
susceptibility to shoulder-surfing attacks (Tari, Ozok & Holden, 2006), and we consider
these issues also. However, Passfaces is an established commercial system. Facelock, as
an experimental proposal, is unfettered by implementation concerns. Any attempt to
compare performance directly would thus be rather unfair on Passfaces. Indeed, the
general question of which system authentication system is ‘best’ is likely too simplistic.
Any approach will have its own profile of strengths of weaknesses, and will be better
suitedtosomesituations—andtosomeusers—thantoothers.
• Wedoclaimthatitiseasyforuserstogenerateasetoffacesthatarewellknowntothem,
butnottootherpeople.Weshowthatanauthenticationcodebasedonsuchfacesmakes
it easy for the user to login, even after a year of disuse, as it does not require the user
to commit anything to memory. The user’s authentication code is difficult for other
people to guess, even for close acquaintances such as spouses. It is also highly resistant
toshoulder-surfing,asimagechangesthataretransparentforthe(familiar)userarenot
transparentforthe(unfamiliar)attacker.
Moregenerally,weproposethatresearchintographicalauthenticationsystemscanexploit
findings from psychological research, and that psychological research can be enriched
by considering applied problems in other fields. Image recognition is not the same as
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 20/24face recognition. Unfamiliar face recognition is not the same as familiar face recognition.
Not all observers are equal. These insights offer much scope for innovation in face-based
graphical authentication systems,and we hope that thecurrent studies might spur further
developmentinthisdirection.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND DECLARATIONS
Funding
ThisworkwassupportedbyanESRCgrant(060-25-0010)toRobJenkinsandaWellcome
Trust Vacation Scholarship to Jane McLachlan. The funders had no role in study design,
datacollectionandanalysis,decisiontopublish,orpreparationofthemanuscript.
Grant Disclosures
Thefollowinggrantinformationwasdisclosedbytheauthors:
EconomicandSocialResearchCouncilUKESRC060-25-0010.
WellcomeTrustVacationScholarship.
Competing Interests
Theauthorsdeclaretherearenocompetinginterests.
Author Contributions
• Rob Jenkins and Karen Renaud conceived and designed the experiments, analyzed the
data, contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools, wrote the paper, prepared figures
and/ortables,revieweddraftsofthepaper.
• Jane L. McLachlan performed the experiments, analyzed the data, contributed
reagents/materials/analysistools,revieweddraftsofthepaper.
Human Ethics
Thefollowinginformationwassuppliedrelatingtoethicalapprovals(i.e.,approvingbody
andanyreferencenumbers):
FIMSfacultyethicscommittee,UniversityofGlasgow:ApprovalnumberCSE00871.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental information for this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/
10.7717/peerj.444.
REFERENCES
Adams A, Sasse MA. 1999. Users are not the enemy: why users compromise computer security
mechanisms and how to take remedial measures. Communications of the ACM 42:41–46
DOI 10.1145/322796.322806.
Anderson R. 1993. Why cryptosystems fail. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on computer
and communications security. ACM, 215–227 DOI 10.1145/168588.168615.
Bengio Y. 2009. Learning deep architectures for AI. Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning
2:1–127 DOI 10.1561/2200000006.
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 21/24Biddle R, Chiasson S, Van Oorschot PC. 2012. Graphical passwords: learning from the first twelve
years. ACM Computing Surveys 44:1–19 DOI 10.1145/2333112.2333114.
Blonder G. 1996. Graphical passwords. US Patent 5559961.
Braun J. 1998. Divided attention: narrowing the gap between brain and behavior. In: Parasuraman
R, ed. The attentive brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 327–351.
BrostoffS, Sasse MA. 2000. Are Passfaces more usable than passwords? A field trial investigation.
In: McDonald S, Waern Y, Cockton G, eds. People and computers XIV—usability or else!
Proceedings of HCI 2000. 405–424.
Bruce V. 1982. Changing faces. Visual and non-visual coding processing in face recognition. British
Journal of Psychology 73:105–116 DOI 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1982.tb01795.x.
Bruce V, Henderson Z, Greenwood K, Hancock P, Burton AM, Miller P. 1999. Verification of
face identities from images captured on video. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
5:339–360.
Bruce V, Henderson Z, Newman C, Burton AM. 2001. Matching identities of familiar and
unfamiliar faces caught on CCTV images. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
7:207–218.
Bunnell J, Podd J, Henderson R, Napier R, Kennedy-Moffat J. 1997. Cognitive, associative and
conventional passwords: recall and guessing rates. Computers & Security 16:629–641
DOI 10.1016/S0167-4048(97)00008-4.
Burton AM, Jenkins R. 2011. Unfamiliar face perception. In: Calder AJ, Rhodes G, Johnson MH,
Haxby JV, eds. Handbook of face perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 287–306.
Burton AM, Jenkins R, Schweinberger SR. 2011. Mental representations of familiar faces. British
Journal of Psychology 102:943–958 DOI 10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02039.x.
Burton AM, Wilson S, Cowan M, Bruce V. 1999. Face recognition in poor quality video: evidence
from security surveillance. Psychological Science 10:243–248 DOI 10.1111/1467-9280.00144.
Carstens DS. 2009. Human and social aspects of password authentication. In: Gupta M,
Sharman R, eds. Social and human elements of information security: emerging trends and
countermeasures. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 1–14.
Clutterbuck R, Johnston RA. 2002. Exploring levels of face familiarity by using an indirect
face-matching measure. Perception 31:985–994 DOI 10.1068/p3335.
Clutterbuck R, Johnston RA. 2004. Matching as an index of face familiarity. Visual Cognition
11:857–869 DOI 10.1080/13506280444000021.
Clutterbuck R, Johnston RA. 2005. Demonstrating how unfamiliar faces become familiar using a
face matching task. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 17:97–116
DOI 10.1080/09541440340000439.
Craik FIM, Lockhart RS. 1972. Levels of processing: a framework for memory research. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 11:671–684 DOI 10.1016/S0022-5371(72)80001-X.
Datta R, Joshi D, Li J, Wang JZ. 2008. Image retrieval: ideas, influences, and trends of the new age.
ACM Computing Surveys 40:1–60 DOI 10.1145/1348246.1348248.
Davis D, Monrose F, Reiter M. 2004. On user choice in graphical password schemes. In: 13th
USENIX security symposium. 2004: 151–164.
De Angeli A, Coventry L, Johnson G, Renaud K. 2005. Is a picture really worth a thousand
words? On the feasibility of graphical authentication systems. International Journal of
Human–Computer Studies 63:128–152 DOI 10.1016/j.ijhcs.2005.04.020.
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 22/24De Haan EHF, Young AW, Newcombe F. 1991. A dissociation between sense of familiarity and
access to semantic information concerning familiar people. European Journal of Cognitive
Psychology 3:51–67 DOI 10.1080/09541449108406219.
Dhamija R, Perrig A. 2000. D´ ej` a vu: a user study using images for authentication. In: Proceedings
of USENIX security symposium 2000, 45–58.
Dunphy P, Nicholson J, Oliver P. 2008. Securing passfaces for description. In: SOUPS 2008,
Proceedings of the fourth symposium on usable privacy and security. 145: 24–35.
Ebbinghaus H. 1964. Memory: a contribution to experimental psychology. Ruger HA, Bussenius CE,
trans. New York: Dover.
Everitt KM, Bragin T, Fogarty J, Kohno T. 2009. A comprehensive study of frequency,
interference, and training of multiple graphical passwords. In: CHI Proceedings of the 27th
international conference on human factors in computing systems. 889–898.
Furnell S, Papadopoulos I, Dowland P. 2004. A long-term trial of alternative user
authentication technologies. Information Management & Computer Security 12:178–190
DOI 10.1108/09685220410530816.
Garfinkel S, Spafford G. 1996. Practical UNIX & internet security, 2nd edition. Sebastopol, CA:
O’Reilly & Associates.
Gehringer EF. 2002. Choosing passwords: security and human factors. In: International symposium
on technology and society, 2002. 369–373 DOI 10.1109/ISTAS.2002.1013839.
Harmon LD. 1973. The recognition of faces. Scientific American 227:71–82.
Jenkins R, Burton AM. 2008. 100% accuracy in automatic face recognition. Science
319:435 DOI 10.1126/science.1149656.
Jenkins R, Burton AM. 2011. Stable face representations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B 366:1671–1683 DOI 10.1098/rstb.2010.0379.
Jenkins R, White D, Montfort X, Burton AM. 2011. Variability in photos of the same face.
Cognition 121:313–323 DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.08.001.
Lacroix JPW, Postma EO, Murre JMJ. 2005. Predicting experimental similarity ratings and
recognition rates for individual natural stimuli with the NIM model. In: Bara B, Barsalou
L, Bucciarelli M, eds. Proceedings of the 27th annual meeting of the cognitive science society.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1225–1230.
Liu J, Harris A, Kanwisher N. 2002. Stages of processing in face perception: an MEG study. Nature
Neuroscience 5:910–916 DOI 10.1038/nn909.
Megreya AM, Burton AM. 2006. Unfamiliar faces are not faces: evidence from a matching task.
Memory and Cognition 34:865–876 DOI 10.3758/BF03193433.
Mihajlov M, Jerman-Blazic B. 2011. On designing usable and secure recognition-based graphical
authentication mechanisms. Interacting with Computers 23:582–593
DOI 10.1016/j.intcom.2011.09.001.
Miller GA. 1956. The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for
processing information. Psychological Review 63:81–97 DOI 10.1037/h0043158.
Paivio A, Csapo K. 1973. Picture superiority in free recall: imagery or dual coding? Cognitive
Psychology 5:176–206 DOI 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90032-7.
Podd J, Bunnell J, Henderson R. 1996. Cost-effective computer security: cognitive and associative
passwords. In: 6th Australian conference on computer–human interaction. IEEE, 304–305
DOI 10.1109/OZCHI.1996.560026.
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 23/24Sasse MA, BrostoffS, Weirich D. 2001. Transforming the ‘weakest link’: a human/computer
interaction approach to usable and effective security. BT Technology Journal 19:122–131
DOI 10.1023/A:1011902718709.
Sinha P, Balas B, Ostrovsky Y, Russell R. 2006. Face recognition by humans: 19 results all
computer vision researchers should know about. Proceedings of the IEEE 94:1948–1962
DOI 10.1109/JPROC.2006.884093.
Tam L, Glassman M, Vandenwauver M. 2010. The psychology of password management: a
tradeoff between security and convenience. Behaviour Information Technology 29:233–244
DOI 10.1080/01449290903121386.
Tari F, Ozok AA, Holden SH. 2006. A comparison of perceived and real shouldersurfing risks
between alphanumeric and graphical passwords. In: Proceedings of the second symposium on
usable privacy and security. ACM international conference proceedings series. 149: 56–66.
Valentine T. 1998. An evaluation of the Passface personal authentication system. Technical Report.
London: Goldsmiths College University of London.
Weinshall D, Kirkpatrick S. 2004. Passwords you’ll never forget, but can’t recall. In: Proceedings of
ACM CHI 2004 conference on human factors in computing systems. 2: 1399–1402.
Witty RJ, Brittain K. 2004. Automated password reset can cut IT service desk costs. Stamford, CT:
Gartner, Inc.
Young AW, Hay DC, Ellis AW. 1985. The faces that launched a thousand slips: everyday difficulties
and errors in recognizing people. British Journal of Psychology 76:495–523
DOI 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1985.tb01972.x.
Zviran M, Haga WJ. 1990. Cognitive passwords: the key to easy access control. Computers and
Security 9:723–736 DOI 10.1016/0167-4048(90)90115-A.
Zviran M, Haga WJ. 1993. A comparison of password techniques for multilevel authentication
mechanisms. The Computer Journal 36:227–237 DOI 10.1093/comjnl/36.3.227.
Jenkins et al. (2014), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.444 24/24